This paper examines the role and estimates the economic value of social networks tied to academic institutions in the venture capital industry. I show that having a shared academic background increases the likelihood of matching between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists by 57%. Similarly, a shared academic background increases the likelihood of matching between di¤erent venture capitalists by 42% when they syndicate portfolio company investments. Finally, a shared academic background improves portfolio company performance. For example, when an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist attended the same Top 3 academic institution, the likelihood that the investment will result in an initial public o¤ering or acquisition increases by 42%. This is the incremental e¤ect of having attended the same Top 3 academic institution. Taken together, these results provide strong evidence that shared academic backgrounds help reduce information gaps in the venture capital industry.
Introduction
Anecdotal evidence suggests that social networks are important in the venture capital industry (Gompers and Lerner (2001) ). Still, research in …nance so far has given little consideration to this question. Two exceptions are Sorenson and Stuart (2001) and Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) . They show that social networks formed when venture capitalists syndicate portfolio company investments a¤ect outcomes in the venture capital industry. Less is known about the e¤ects of social networks tied to academic institutions.
The novel contribution of this paper is to introduce social networks of the latter type into the analysis of the likelihood of matching and performance in the venture capital industry. More speci…cally, …rst I examine the role of social networks in the matching between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists on a sample of venture capital investments. Then I examine how social networks a¤ect the matching between di¤erent venture capitalists when they syndicate portfolio company investments on a sample of syndicated venture capital investments. Finally, I look at the economic e¤ect of social networks on portfolio company performance. For this purpose I assemble a unique dataset with all early stage venture capital investments made by U.S. venture capital …rms in U.S. portfolio companies during
2002.
The …nal sample consists of 735 distinct investments rounds made by 456 venture capital …rms in 651 portfolio companies.
My results show that, after controlling for venture capital …rm, portfolio company, and investment round characteristics, the likelihood of matching between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists increases by 57% (or equivalently with 0:29%) when they attended the same academic institution. Closer inspection reveals that this e¤ect is stronger for smaller and younger venture capital …rms and for Non-Ivy League and Non-Top 3 academic institutions.
1 Similarly, when di¤erent venture capitalists syndicate portfolio company investments, the likelihood of matching increases by 42% (or equivalently with 0:23%) when they attended the same acad-emic institution. This e¤ect is stronger for Top 3 academic institutions, however. Finally, having a shared academic background improves portfolio company performance. In particular, when the academic institution is Top 3, the likelihood that the investment will result in an initial public o¤ering or acquisition increases by 42% (or equivalently with 14%). This is the incremental e¤ect of having attended the same Top 3 academic institution and is therefore over and above the e¤ect of having an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist from di¤erent Top 3 academic institutions. Taken together, these results provide strong evidence that shared academic backgrounds help reduce information gaps in the venture capital industry. A back of the envelope calculation emphasizes the economic impact of this e¤ect. For example, consider a situation where there are only two possible future states of the world and ignore discounting. In one state the portfolio company investment is successful and results in an initial public o¤ering or acquisition worth $113 M.
In the other state the portfolio company investment fails and it is worth zero. In this stylized case, having a shared academic background increase the present value of the portfolio company investments by roughly $16 M.
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These results complement a number of recent studies on the impact of social networks in corporate …nance. To name a few, directors'social networks have been shown to in ‡uence the composition and quality of boards (Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) ) as well as the level of executive pay (Barnea and Guedj (2007) ); investment bankers'social networks a¤ect investment banks'market shares in mergers and acquisitions and equity capital markets (Bradley and Clarke (2008) ). More closely related to my study are Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) and Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) . By linking mutual fund managers' investment behavior and equity analysts'stock recommendations to social networks tied to academic institutions they show that these social networks in ‡uence how information ‡ow into public equity markets. While my study uses a similar social network as Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) , it is applied di¤erently. In particular, they focus on public equity markets whereas I focus on venture capital markets.
For that reason, my study is also related to the literature on venture capi-tal. This literature has studied the monitoring role of venture capitalists (Gorman and Sahlman (1989) , Lerner (1995) , and Bottazzi, Rin, and Hellmann (2007) ); speci…cities in venture capital contracts (Gompers (1995) , Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) , and Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) ); the syndication of venture capital investments (Lerner (1994) ); and the role of venture capital in innovation (Kortum and Lerner (2000) and Lerner and Strömberg (2008) ). Closer related to my study are Sorenson and Stuart (2001) and Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) . They examine how social networks, formed when venture capitalists syndicate portfolio company investments, a¤ect outcomes in the venture capital industry. While the former focuses on the geographical distribution of portfolio company investments, the latter focuses on performance. My study di¤ers from these in several ways. Firstly, the social networks are di¤erent. Secondly, they focus on the relationship between their social networks and the geographical distribution and performance of portfolio company investments. I focus on the relationship between my social networks and the likelihood matching between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists as well as portfolio company performance. The main contribution of my study is to show that social networks tied to academic institutions reduce information gaps between entrepreneur and venture capitalists. The main support for this interpretation is that these social networks lead to superior portfolio company performance. Nonetheless, my study also explains how syndicates are formed in the venture capital industry. For example, I show that the likelihood of matching between di¤erent venture capitalists increases when they attended the same academic institution when they syndicate portfolio company investments. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of why social networks tied to academic institutions should a¤ect the likelihood of matching and performance in the venture capital industry. Section 3 describes the data used in this study and explains how I construct my sample. Section 4 outlines my empirical methodology and presents the results from the empirical analysis on matching in the venture capital industry. Section 5 presents the results from the empirical analysis on portfolio company performance. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and o¤ers some concluding remarks.
Why should social networks matter?
Venture capital markets are distinguished by the large information gap that exists between those who need and those who provide …nancing. Sometimes this information gap favors entrepreneurs, who know more about the businesses they are running. Other times it favors venture capitalists, who know more about the commercialization or …nancing processes. Ultimately, the fear of such information gaps prevent otherwise pro…table transactions. By reducing such information gaps, social networks make possible some investments that would otherwise not have been possible. For example, when entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are part of the same social network, search and transaction costs associated with identifying and evaluating portfolio company investments are lower. Similarly, when two di¤erent venture capitalists are part of the same social network, costs of investing together are lower. As a result, social networks should be expected to in ‡uence the matching between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists as well as the matching between di¤erent venture capitalists when they syndicate portfolio company investments. Furthermore, if social networks render some individuals an information advantage vis-à-vis other, then those who enjoy the information advantage should earn abnormal returns on this information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) ). Therefore, portfolio company investments where entrepreneurs and venture capitalists belong to the same social network should be expected to perform better than those where they are not.
The main objective of this study is to show that social networks tied to academic institutions reduce information gaps in the venture capital industry. For that reason, I …rst show that social networks tied to academic institutions are positively related to the matching between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists as well as between di¤erent venture capitalists when they syndicate portfolio company investments. I then show that social networks tied to academic institutions improve portfolio company performance.
Data
The data used in this study comes from several di¤erent sources. In particular, the data on venture capital investments comes from the VentureXpert database (now owned by Thomson Financial). It provides information on venture capital and private equity …rms, funds, portfolio companies, executives and directors, and limited partners. Investments and commitments dates back to 1969 and include over 15; 000 venture capital and private equity …rms, 27; 000 funds, and over 70; 000 portfolio companies. Venture capital …rms, funds, and portfolio companies relate to each other in the following way. Venture capital …rms are management companies that manage funds. While funds usually have limited lifetimes (e.g. 10 12 years), venture capital …rms usually have in…nite lifetimes. Portfolio companies represent the businesses that venture capital …rms invest in through their funds.
This data is supplemented with the education background of the portfolio companies'entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists who served on the portfolio companies' board of directors. I de…ne entrepreneurs as the non-venture capitalist founding members of the portfolio companies. Speci…cally, I require that the entrepreneurs were part of the founding members during the portfolio company founding year and that they were not employed by the venture capital …rms that …nanced the portfolio company. The information on entrepreneurs and venture capitalists as well as their education background comes from the VentureXpert database, ZoomInfo, LinkedIn, Company Insight Center (CIC), old portfolio company-and venture capital …rm websites, REGDEX documents and IPO prospectuses.
3 ZoomInfo is a business information search engine with data on industries, companies, people, products and services. It crawls the web to identify company and people information which it organizes into company and individual pro…les. 5 Specialization is one reason why venture capitalists are able to invest in situations with severe information gaps to begin with. 6 In robustness checks I relax the second requirement and the results are una¤ected.
For this purpose I focus on those investments that actually took place, notably my cross section of investments from 2002. In both cases, since this study examines social networks tied to academic institutions, I require an education background on at least one of the entrepreneurs and at least one of the venture capitalists who invested in the portfolio company.
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The de…nition and construction of the speci…c variables used in the empirical analysis are reported in the Data appendix.
Sample description
Table (1) and (2) present descriptive statistics for the …nal sample of venture capital …rms, portfolio companies, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The sample consists of 456 venture capital …rms and 651 portfolio companies. The majority of venture capital …rms are private equity …rms that invest their own capital (80% of all venture capital …rms). The average venture capital …rm is 10 years old and manages around $1:1 billion. Meanwhile, the average portfolio company is 2:5 years old and 40% of the portfolio companies operate in computer related industries. Up to now 60% of all portfolio companies remain active, 4:3% has gone public, and 27% have been acquired. The total number of investment rounds is 735 of which 60% are new investments and 40% are follow-on investments. The average amount invested per round is $4:4 million. Finally, the total number of entrepreneurs is 1197 (or 1:8 per portfolio company) while the total number of venture capitalists is 957 (or 2:1 per venture capital …rm). Table ( 3) presents summary statistics and a correlation matrix for the main variables used in the subsequent analysis. 7 I focus on the education background of the portfolio companies'entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists who served on the portfolio companies'board of directors. I look at entrepreneurs instead of the chief executive o¢ cer or president because portfolio companies that obtain venture capital …nancing often experience a change in management whereby the original management team is replaced with a seasoned management team. This new management team might have other relationships with the venture capital …rm that I do not want to measure. Still, in practice the entrepreneur is often the chief executive o¢ cer, the president and/or the chief technology o¢ cer of the portfolio company. On the venture capital …rm side I focus on the venture capitalists who served on the portfolio companies'board of directors. I do so because venture capital …rms often assign one (or two) of their partners to their portfolio companies'board of directors. These partners are responsible for the investments and work closely with the portfolio companies' management teams.
Most connected academic institutions
To get a sense of how connected my sample of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists is to di¤erent academic institutions, Table (5) lists the 10 most connected academic institutions for entrepreneurs and venture capitalists respectively. An entrepreneur is connected to an academic institution if he/she attended it during either undergraduate or graduate studies. Similarly, a venture capitalist is connected to an academic institution if he/she attended it during undergraduate or graduate studies. Entrepreneurs are most connected academic University of California (representing 5:1% of the total number of connections) followed by Stanford University and Harvard University. Meanwhile, venture capitalists are most connected to Harvard University (representing 11:3% of the total number of connections) followed by Stanford University and University of California. Finally, Ivy League represents 24:6% and 11:6% of the total number of connections for venture capitalists and entrepreneurs respectively.
4 Matching in the venture capital industry
Empirical methodology
This section examines the e¤ect of social networks tied to academic institutions on the likelihood of matching between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists as well as between di¤erent venture capitalists when they syndicate portfolio company investments. To estimate this e¤ect I propose the following linear probability model:
where y ij is a dummy that equals one for actual investments (syndications) and zero for potential investments (syndications), is a constant, School tie ij is a dummy that equals when the venture capitalist has attended the same academic institution as any of the portfolio company's entrepreneurs, X ij represents a vector of covariates, and " ij is an error term. The remaining variables in equation (1) Investment ij , is a dummy that equals one for actual investments and zero for potential investments. The main independent variable of interest, School tie ij , is a dummy that equals one when the venture capitalist has attended the same academic institution as any of the portfolio company's entrepreneurs.
Overall, the …ndings in Table ( 6) suggest that venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are more likely to match when they have attended the same academic institution in the past. This e¤ect is both statistically and economically signi…cant. More speci…cally: After controlling for venture capital …rm-, portfolio company-, and investment characteristics, the likelihood of matching between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs increases by 57% (or equivalently with 0:29%) when they attended the same academic institution in the past.
Robustness of results
The …ndings reported above suggest that on average venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are more likely to match when they have attended the same academic institution in the past. To verify the robustness of these …ndings I conduct a series 8 All dependent variables in this study are binary. Still, the presented estimates are obtained from ordinary least squares regressions. Because these estimates are consistent but not e¢ cient, this approach results in conservative estimates of the associated standard errors (Wooldridge (2002) ). In unreported robustness checks I estimate probit and conditional logit models and con…rm that the results remain unchanged. of robustness checks. In particular, two straightforward checks examine how these …ndings relate to venture capital …rm experience and academic institution quality.
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Venture capital …rm experience Table (7) presents the results from estimations of (1) after including two additional interaction terms. The …rst one, School tie F irm size, is the product of School tie ij and F irm size j . Similarly, the second one, School tie F irm age, is the product of School tie ij and F irm age j . I …nd a negative and statistically signi…cant relationship between the dependent variable and the interaction terms. This implies that having attended the same academic institution in the past matter more for smaller and younger venture capital …rms in the matching between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. One plausible explanation for this result is that social networks tied to academic institutions and other professional social networks act as substitutes. For example, when venture capitalists start out their career, they use the social networks closest to them, like those tied to academic institutions. As they gain more professional experience, they rely increasingly on other professional social networks, like those formed when syndicating portfolio company investments. As a result, larger and older venture capital …rms rely more on professional social networks and less on social networks tied to academic institutions. Table ( 8) presents the results from estimations of (1) for di¤erent measures of School tie ij . More speci…cally, I consider four di¤erent measures of School tie ij to capture salient characteristics of the academic institution quality. These are Ivy League tie ij , N on Ivy League tie ij , T op 3 tie ij , and N on T op 3 tie ij .
Academic institution quality
3 tie ij are positive and statistically signi…cant, whereas the coe¢ cients in front of Ivy League tie ij and T op 3 tie ij are statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are more likely to match when they attended the same academic institution, but only when the academic institution is Non-Ivy League or Non-Top 3.
Summary
Overall, the results from this subsection suggest that social networks tied to academic institutions are positively related to the likelihood of matching between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. More speci…cally, the likelihood of matching increases by 57%, when the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist have attended the same academic institution in the past. Closer inspection reveals that this effect is stronger for smaller and younger venture capital …rms compared to larger and older ones. Finally, these results are mainly driven by Non-Ivy League and Non-Top 3 academic institutions.
Di¤erent venture capitaltsts
While the previous …ndings relate to the matching between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, this subsection examines the matching between di¤erent venture capitalists as they syndicate portfolio company investments. Table (9) presents the results from estimations of equation (1) with di¤erent sets of covariates. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. The dependent variable, Syndication ij , is a dummy that equals one for actual syndications and zero for potential syndications. The main independent variable of interest, School tie ij , equals one when the leadand non-lead venture capitalist have attended the same academic institution in the past.
By and large, the …ndings in Table ( 9) imply that di¤erent venture capitalists are more likely to match when they have attended the same academic institution in the past. This e¤ect is both statistically signi…cant and economically relevant. In particular: After controlling for lead-and non-lead venture capital …rm-, portfolio company-, and investment characteristics, the likelihood of matching between di¤erent venture capitalists increases by 42% (or equivalently with 0:23%) when they attended the same academic institution.
Robustness of results
The above …ndings imply that in general di¤erent venture capitalists are more likely to match when they have attended the same academic institution in the past. To con…rm the robustness of these …ndings I perform a series of robustness checks. Like before, two simple checks examine how these …ndings relate to nonlead venture capital …rm experience and academic institution quality.
11
Non-lead venture capital …rm experience Table ( 10) presents the results for estimations of equation (1) with the inclusion of two new covariates. The …rst one, School tie F irm size, is the product of School tie ij and N on lead F irm size j . Similarly, the second one, School tie F irm age, is the product of School tie ij and N on lead F irm age j . While I …nd a negative relationship between the dependent variable and the interaction terms, the e¤ect is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that social networks tied to academic institutions play an equally important role in the matching between di¤erent venture capitalists for small-and large-and young-and old venture capital …rms. Table ( 11) presents the results from estimations of equation (1) for the same measures of School tie ij as above. The …ndings in Table ( 11) suggest that academic institution quality matters for the matching between di¤erent venture capitalists. More precisely, the coe¢ cient in front of T op 3 tie ij is positive and statistically signi…cant, whereas the coe¢ cients in front of Ivy League tie ij , N on Ivy League tie ij and N on T op 3 tie ij are statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that di¤erent venture capitalists are more likely to match when they attended the same academic institution in the past, but only when the academic institution is Top 3.
Academic institution quality

Summary
Taken together, the …ndings in this subsection suggest that social networks tied to academic institutions are positively related to the likelihood of matching between di¤erent venture capitalists when they syndicate portfolio company investments. In particular, the likelihood of matching increases by 42%, when the lead and non-lead venture capitalist have attended the same academic institution in the past. Finally, a closer look reveals that these results are mainly driven by Top 3 academic institutions.
5 Portfolio company performance
Empirical methodology
The previous section examines the relationship between social networks tied to academic institutions and matching in the venture capital industry. While this relationship is important to understand what drives …nancing and risk sharing in the venture capital industry, the question begs whether social networks tied to academic institutions also improve portfolio company performance. The objective of this subsection is to address this question. To estimate this e¤ect I propose the following linear probability model:
where y ij is a dummy that equals one when the portfolio company's current situation is coded as either "Went Public" or "Acquisition" by Venture Economics, is a constant, School tie ij is a dummy that equals when the venture capitalist has attended the same academic institution as any of the portfolio company's entrepreneurs, X ij represents a vector of covariates, and " ij is an error term. The remaining variables in equation (2) are …xed e¤ects for portfolio company states and industries. Finally, as above, when estimating equation (2), I account for a general correlation structure between di¤erent observations for the same portfolio company or venture capital …rm by double-clustering standard errors at the portfolio company-and venture capital …rm level. This way I minimize the risk of Type 1 errors by using conservative estimates of standard errors.
Results
Table (12) presents the results from estimations of equation (2) with di¤erent sets of covariates. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. The dependent variable, P erf ormance ij , is a dummy that equals one when the portfolio company's current situation is coded as either "Went Public" or "Acquisition" by Venture Economics. Although this is a coarse measure of investment outcomes, it is frequently used in the venture capital literature. For example, Gompers and Lerner (1998) , Bottazzi, Rin, and Hellmann (2007) , and Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) all de…ne portfolio company success in this way. 12 The main independent variable of interest,
School tie ij , is the same as above.
The …ndings in Table ( 12) suggest that there is an economically relevant positive relationship between social networks tied to academic institutions and portfolio company performance. 13 The estimated e¤ect is statistically indistinguishable from zero, however.
Robustness of the results
The …ndings above imply that on average portfolio company performance improves when the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur have attended the same academic institution in the past. To verify the robustness of these …ndings I carry out a series of robustness checks. In particular, a straightforward check examines how these …ndings relate to academic institution quality.
14 12 Gompers and Lerner (1998) compare this measure of portfolio company success to the more narrow de…nition that excludes acquisitions and …nd that the di¤erent measures give qualitatively similar results. 13 In particular, the coe¢ cient in front of School tie ij suggests that the likelihood that the investment will result in an initial public o¤ering or acquisition increases by 24% (or equivalently with 8%) when the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur attended the same academic institution in the past.
14 In addition to the robustness checks included below, the Selection model appendix presents results for estimations of two stage selection models à la Heckman (1979) . Table ( 13) presents the results from estimations of equation (2) for the same measures of School tie ij as above.
Academic institution quality
By and large, the …ndings in Table ( 13) imply that academic institution quality matters for portfolio company performance. In particular, the coe¢ cient in front of T op 3 tie ij is positive and statistically signi…cant, whereas the coe¢ cients in front of Ivy League tie ij , N on Ivy League tie ij and N on T op 3 tie ij are statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that social networks tied to academic institutions improve portfolio company performance, but only when the academic institution is Top 3.
In particular, the interpretation and economic e¤ect of these …ndings are as follows: The …ndings in Column (5) implies that the likelihood that the investment will result in an initial public o¤ering or acquisition increases by 42% when the entrepreneur and venture capitalist have attended the same Top 3 academic institution in the past. Still, this estimate is confounded by the e¤ect of having an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist from a Top 3 academic institution. Therefore, Column (6) includes separate controls for whether or not the entrepreneur or the venture capitalist attended a Top 3 academic institution. In this speci…cation, the coe¢ cient in front of School tie ij measures the incremental e¤ect of having attended the same Top 3 academic institution over and above the e¤ect of having an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist from a Top 3 academic institution. Finally, the …ndings in Column (6) implies that the likelihood that the investment will result in an initial public o¤ering or acquisition increases by 42% when the entrepreneur and venture capitalist have attended the same Top 3 academic institution.
Summary
Overall, the results from this section suggest that social networks tied to academic institutions also improve portfolio company performance. This …nding is particularly strong when the academic institution is Top 3. Then, the likelihood that the investment will result in an initial public o¤ering or acquisition increases by 42% when the entrepreneur and venture capitalist attended the same academic institution in the past. This e¤ect is over and above the e¤ect of having an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist from a Top 3 academic institution. Taken together, these results provide strong evidence that social networks tied to academic institutions help reduce information gaps prevalent in the venture capital industry.
Conclusions
The primary objective of this study is to show that social networks tied to academic institutions reduce information gaps in the venture capital industry. For this purpose, I …rst establish a positive relationship between social networks tied to academic institutions and matching in the venture capital industry. More specifically, I show that the likelihood of matching between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists increases by 57% when they attended the same academic institution in the past. Similarly, the likelihood of matching between di¤erent venture capitalists increases by 42% when they attended the same academic institution in the past. I then show that social networks tied to academic institutions improve portfolio company performance. In particular, the likelihood that portfolio company investments result in initial public o¤erings or acquisitions increases by 42% when the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur attended the same Top 3 academic institution in the past. Taken together, these …ndings imply that social networks tied to academic institutions reduce information gaps between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.
A Selection model appendix
One bene…t of studying social networks tied to academic institutions is that they are formed long before the actual investment takes place. As a result, they are relatively uncorrelated with present investment decisions of pro…t maximizing venture capitalists. Nonetheless, potential selection issues have to be considered. In this study, the main concern is whether the estimated positive correlation between School tie ij and Investment ij , Syndication ij , or P erf ormance ij is caused by some omitted variable. To address this issue, I estimate a two stage selection model à la Heckman (1979) . As always, a perfect instrument for School tie ij is hard to imagine. Still, based on Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and Bottazzi, Rin, and Hellmann (2007) I consider two di¤erent exclusionary restrictions. Firstly, I include portfolio company state and venture capital …rm state interactions in the (…rst stage) selection equation, but not in the (second stage) outcome equation (Bottazzi, Rin, and Hellmann (2007) ). Secondly, I include portfolio company state and industry as well as portfolio company state and stage interactions in the selection equation, but not in the outcome equation (Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) ). After estimating the selection equation I predict the likelihood of being selected for the outcome equation and compute the associated Inverse Mills ratio. Finally, I include the Inverse Mills ratio when I estimate the outcome equation. Below I describe the observations used in the selection and outcome equations in the setting of: Matching in the venture capital industry and Portfolio company performance.
A.1 Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists
The selection equation uses all actual and potential investments. The outcome equation uses all actual investments, but only those potential investments where the venture capitalist has invested in the same state and industry as the portfolio company at least once during the last …ve years. Table (14) presents the results from estimations of the selection model under the exclusionary restrictions described above. Although a better instrument for School tie ij is desirable, the selection model does not change the conclusions from the baseline speci…cation.
A.2 Di¤erent venture capitalists
The selection equation uses all actual and potential syndications. The outcome equation uses all actual syndications, but only those potential syndications where the non-lead venture capitalist has invested in the same state and industry as the portfolio company at least once during the last …ve years. Table ( 15) presents the results from estimations of the selection model under the aforementioned exclusionary restrictions. Like above, the selection model does not change the conclusions from the baseline speci…cation.
A.3 Portfolio company performance
The selection equation uses the same observations as the outcome equation in "Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists". The outcome equation uses actual investments. Table ( 16) presents the results from estimations of the selection model under the exclusionary restrictions described above. Again, the selection model con…rms the conclusions from the baseline speci…cation.
B Data appendix
The speci…c variables used in the empirical analysis are de…ned as follows:
B.1 Dependent variables
Investment is a dummy that equals one for those investments that actually took place and zero for potential investments.
Syndication is a dummy that equals one for those syndications that actually took place and zero for potential syndications.
Performance is a dummy that equals one whenever the portfolio company's current situation is coded as either "Went Public" or "Acquisition" by Venture Economics.
B.2 Independent variables
School tie is a dummy that equals one for those investments where the venture capitalist has attended the same academic institution as any of the portfolio company's entrepreneurs. In the matching between lead-and non-lead venture capitalists, it equals one for those syndications where the non-lead venture capitalist has attended the same academic institution as the lead venture capitalists.
Ivy League tie, Non-Ivy League tie, Top 3 tie, Non-top 3 tie are dummies that equals one for those investments where the venture capitalist has attended the same academic institution as any of the portfolio company's entrepreneurs and this academic institution is an Ivy League, Non-Ivy League, etc.
Ivy League venture capitalist and Ivy League entrepreneur are dummies that equals one when the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur has attended an Ivy League academic institution. Similarly for Non-Ivy League, Top 3, Non-top 3.
Distance is the natural logarithm of the geographical distance (in miles) between the centre points of the portfolio company's-and venture capital …rm's …ve digit zip codes+1.
Deal size is the natural logarithm of the amount invested in the company during 2002 measured in millions of dollars+1.
Company age is the natural logarithm of the di¤erence between 2003 and the portfolio company's founding year.
Seed/Startup is a dummy that equals one when the investment is classi…ed as a seed-or startup investment by Venture Economics.
Firm age is the natural logarithm of the di¤erence between 2003 and the venture capital …rm's founding year.
Firm size is the natural logarithm of the venture capital …rm's reported capital under management measured in millions of dollars+1.
Firm experience is the natural logarithm of the total number of domestic rounds the venture capital …rm has participated in during the last …ve years. This includes all types of private equity deals such as buyouts, mezzanine, etc.
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Independent …rm is a dummy that equals one when the venture capital …rm is classi…ed as Private Equity Firm Investing Own Capital by Venture Economics.
In addition to these variables most regressions include …xed e¤ects to control for academic institutions, portfolio company states, and portfolio company industries.
C Calculation of the geographical distance
Some regressions include a control for geographical distance. This variable is calculated using the same methodology as in Sorenson and Stuart (2001) .
where latitude (lat) and longitude (long) are the centroids of 5-digit US zipcodes measured in radians and C = 3; 437 represents the earth's radius.
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